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chap t e r t h r e e

Whose Ethics?
The Benchmark Problem in Legal Ethics Research
Elizabeth Chambliss

A recent survey of workplace culture in 15 Australian law firms found “strong
differences” between junior and senior lawyers’ perceptions of ethics support
within their firms and perceptions of their own capacity to raise ethical issues
(Parker and Aitken 2011, 402). Among junior lawyers, only 44% said that they
are always “able to raise ethical issues in confidence,” compared to 75% of senior lawyers (441). Junior lawyers were also less likely to know where to turn
for ethical advice, and to report that their ethical concerns are given consideration in the firm. Among junior lawyers, less than 40% said that their ethical concerns are always given consideration, compared to nearly 80% of senior
lawyers (441).
David Chambers also found significant differences between junior and
senior lawyers in his analysis of data from the University of Michigan Law
School alumni survey (Mather and Levin, chapter 1). Among law graduates
surveyed five years after graduation, only 51% agreed that “the lawyers with
whom I deal . . . are highly ethical,” compared to 63% of those surveyed 35 or
45 years after graduation. This finding was generally consistent across practice specialties.
How should we interpret such differences between junior and senior lawyers? One theory holds that junior lawyers are more reliable informants—that
their perceptions are not yet corrupted by self-interest and the demands of
practice and therefore will tend to be closer to universal or ordinary morality. This is the predominant theory in the academic literature on large law
Thanks to Molly Land, Leslie Levin, Lynn Mather, and Christine Parker for their very helpful comments.
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firms, which tends to portray large law firms as being in perpetual moral
decline (Chambliss 2010) and to portray new associates as sheep to the slaughter. Patrick Schiltz (1999) has described professional socialization in large
law firms as the process of “becoming unethical” (915). To some extent, this
corruption narrative informs all critical legal ethics research.
An alternative theory holds that junior lawyers are inexperienced and/or
naïve and therefore may be unreliable informants about professional matters.
This theory views professional socialization as the process of acquiring knowledge and ethical judgment in complex situations. Junior lawyers, by definition,
have not had time to acquire such knowledge and therefore are in no position
to assess law firm management practices or senior lawyers’ work. Perhaps not
surprisingly, this is the dominant theory among large firm partners and managers (Chambliss 2006).
These two theories of lawyer socialization are not necessarily incompatible.
Research on lawyers provides examples of both “ethical fading” (Tenbrunsel
and Messick 2004), whereby lawyers gradually lose sight of ordinary morality
(Regan 2004; Schiltz 1999), and “ethical learning,” whereby lawyers gradually
acquire specialized ethical expertise (Chambliss and Wilkins 2002a). Moreover,
lawyers may experience both ethical fading and ethical learning at different
stages of their careers, in different practice contexts, and with respect to different issues in their work.
The challenge, however, is defining the benchmark for theoretical analysis. Should lawyers’ ethical standards and conduct be compared to ordinary
(lay) morality? To the formal rules of legal ethics? Or to the prevailing professional norms within a specialized area of practice (which may or may not be
consistent with the formal rules)? The definition of the normative benchmark
itself has theoretical implications and is not always explicit in legal ethics
research.
This chapter examines the use of benchmarks in legal ethics research and
shows how different benchmarks may produce competing—but partial—theoretical claims. It argues, specifically, that the literature is biased toward critical
accounts of “ethical fading” that are based on unspecified and/or internally inconsistent benchmarks. The goal of the chapter is to promote a more consistent
specification of benchmarks in order to build a more holistic theory of lawyer
socialization. A clearer definition of the normative baseline for analysis would
allow more focused comparisons between junior and senior lawyers, as well as
between different types of lawyers, and between lawyers and the members of
other occupational groups.
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The Corruption Narrative: Ethical Fading
Perhaps the most compelling corruption narrative in the legal ethics literature
is Patrick Schiltz’s (1999) provocative and widely read critique of large law firm
practice. According to Schiltz, large law firms systematically socialize young
lawyers to lie, cheat, and steal, while at the same time modeling a variety of
strategies for rationalizing such conduct. His detailed phenomenology of corruption and rationalization is worth quoting at length:
Unethical lawyers do not start out being unethical; they start out just like
you—as perfectly decent young men or women who have every intention
of practicing law ethically. They do not become unethical overnight; they
become unethical just as you will (if you become unethical)—a little bit at a
time. And they do not become unethical by shredding incriminating documents or bribing jurors; they become unethical just as you are likely to—by
cutting a corner here, by stretching the truth a bit there.
Let me tell you how you will start acting unethically: It will start with your
time sheets. One day, not too long after you start practicing law, you will sit
down at the end of a long, tiring day, and you just won’t have much to show
for your efforts in terms of billable hours. It will be near the end of the month.
You will know that all of the partners will be looking at your monthly time
report in a few days, so what you’ll do is pad your time sheet just a bit. Maybe
you will bill a client for ninety minutes for a task that really took you only
sixty minutes to perform. However, you will promise yourself that you will
repay the client at the first opportunity by doing thirty minutes of work for
the client for “free.” In this way, you will be “borrowing,” not “stealing.”
And then what will happen is that it will become easier and easier to take
these little loans against future work. And then, after a while, you will stop
paying back these little loans. . . .
And then you will pad more and more—every two minute telephone
conversation will go down on the sheet as ten minutes, every three hour research project will go down with an extra quarter hour or so. You will continue to rationalize your dishonesty to yourself in various ways until one
day you stop doing even that. And, before long—it won’t take you much
more than three or four years—you will be stealing from your clients almost every day, and you won’t even notice it.
You know what? You will also likely become a liar. A deadline will come
up one day, and, for reasons that are entirely your fault, you will not be able
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to meet it. So you will call your senior partner or your client and make up
a white lie for why you missed the deadline. . . . And then you will be reading through a big box of your client’s documents—a box that has not been
opened in twenty years—and you will find a document that would hurt your
client’s case, but that no one except you knows exists, and you will simply
“forget” to produce it in response to your opponent’s discovery requests.
Do you see what will happen? After a couple years of this, you won’t
even notice that you are lying and cheating and stealing every day that you
practice law. None of these things will seem like a big deal in itself—an extra fifteen minutes added to a time sheet here, a little white lie to cover a
missed deadline there. But, after a while, your entire frame of reference will
change. . . . (916–918)

Schiltz’s portrayal vividly illustrates the process of ethical fading, whereby
one learns to “behave self-interestedly while, at the same time, falsely believing that one’s moral principles were upheld” (Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004,
223). One of the principal enablers of this type of self-deception is the “slippery
slope of decision making,” whereby repeated exposure to ethical dilemmas in
a series of small decisions leads to progressively unethical conduct (228–229).
As Schiltz (1999, 916) argues, young lawyers “do not become unethical overnight” but rather “a little bit at a time.” Ethical fading also is facilitated by language euphemisms (Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004, 227), such as “borrowing”
versus “stealing” and “forgetting” versus “withholding” documents (Schiltz
1999, 917–918). As Schiltz observes, “after a couple years” of relabeling such
decisions, “you won’t even notice that . . . your entire frame of reference” has
changed (918).
Ethical fading is a powerful framework for thinking about lawyers’ ethical
socialization and for explaining the difference between junior and senior lawyers’ perceptions. The empirical literature offers numerous examples of dubious practices that are taken for granted within specialized “communities of
practice” (Mather, McEwen, and Maiman 2001) such as those explored in this
volume: for instance, corporate litigators who learn to withhold potentially
relevant documents in deposition defense (Kirkland, chapter 8; Suchman 1998,
867); prosecutors who learn to hold onto exculpatory material until right before trial (Yaroshefsky and Green, chapter 13); real estate lawyers who learn
to “go get a cup of coffee” when cash passes under the table (Levin 2004, 364);
and personal injury lawyers who “accept every case with significant damages,
serve a complaint, and wait for the check” (Abel 2008, 96). This phenomenon
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is not limited to law. Ann Tenbrunsel and David Messick (2004) illustrate their
theory of ethical fading with examples of corporate misconduct. They argue
that the psychological tendencies that lead to ethical fading “are constant and
pervasive in individuals’ lives” (225).
As applied to legal ethics, however, ethical fading has a benchmark problem. Unlike some other specialized groups that succumb to ethical fading or
“groupthink” (Janis 1972), lawyers are required to adhere to norms that depart
from ordinary morality and therefore may justify (and/or rationalize) their
conduct in terms of positive professional norms. For instance, lawyers are
required to keep client confidences even when doing so imposes high costs on
third parties and societal interests (Liptak 2008). Litigators are expected to be
zealous advocates of the client’s interests even when a neutral observer might
view the client’s cause as unjust (Freedman 1975). Lawyers are expected to
counsel their clients to withhold apologies (Cohen 1999), serve up scapegoats
(Duggin 2008), and protect the client’s own private interests even when public
and other private interests may suffer. These professional norms complicate
the definition of “ethics” in legal ethics research. Who decides whether a practice is dubious or unethical? That is, who defines the normative benchmark
from which ethical fading is measured?
In some contexts, it may seem obvious. For instance, Schiltz (1999, 917) focuses on fraudulent billing, missing deadlines “for reasons that are entirely your
fault,” and secretly withholding an obviously relevant document in discovery.
Most lawyers and laypersons would agree that these are examples of dubious
or unethical conduct. Indeed, the power of Schiltz’s portrayal depends on this
universal appeal.
But what about less obvious questions? The relevance of documents in discovery, for instance, is a notoriously complex question. Experienced litigators
define the ethics of discovery practice primarily in terms of being civil to opponents and “sending honest signals” about gray areas and strategic decisions
to withhold (Kirkland 2005, 722). Academics and other nonlitigators may find
this troubling and interpret it as evidence of ethical fading or some other process of moral corruption (Kirkland 2005; Suchman 1998). But this interpretation
devalues litigators’ experience and specialized expertise. Litigators are taught to
balance the requirements of an adversary system with the truth-seeking functions of the adversary process. Thus, litigators may use a different benchmark
for normative assessment than nonlitigators. This difference complicates the
theoretical analysis of ethical fading. Whose benchmark should be used to distinguish between (undesirable) ethical fading and (desirable) ethical learning?
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Of course, all research on norms and culture confronts this problem to
some extent. Anthropologists have long debated the relative merits of “etic”
approaches, in which theoretical and normative benchmarks are defined by the
researcher, and “emic” approaches designed to understand and describe the
natives’ point of view (Martin 2002, 36–37). But the problem is compounded
when the group under study has a specialized normative code—especially insofar as the code is inaccessible to nonspecialists. Moreover, the code itself is
not a solution to the problem of benchmarks because experienced lawyers may
debate the merits and application of particular rules. Thus, the specialization
of legal ethics—both as a body of positive law and as a subject of debate among
lawyers—makes the choice of benchmarks especially thorny in legal ethics
research.

The Specialization Narrative: Ethical Learning
Lawyers tend to view the process of ethical socialization as the process of acquiring specialized knowledge and judgment in complex situations. Legal
ethical learning typically begins in law school with the formal study of the
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
preparation for the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, a national
examination that is required for bar admission in every state (Levin 1997). Yet
while the Model Rules tend to be the focus of students’ initial exposure, the
actual rules of professional conduct vary substantially from state to state and
are increasingly enmeshed in a web of other state, federal, and international
sources of professional regulation (Chambliss 2001). Moreover, even these increasingly complex rules provide inadequate guidance for the many legal risks
and moral dilemmas that lawyers and law practice organizations confront
(Bernstein 2009; Chambliss 2000; Levin 1997).
Legal ethical learning continues, therefore, within particular practice contexts, both formally, through continuing legal ethics education requirements
and in-house training programs within practice organizations such as large
law firms (Chambliss and Wilkins 2002a) and prosecutors’ offices (Yaroshefsky
2010); and informally, though “advice networks” (Levin 2004) and specialized
communities of practice (Mather, McEwen, and Maiman 2001). Thus, legal
ethical learning has both doctrinal and experiential components.
Both of these components may be relatively inaccessible to laypeople and
junior lawyers (Raymond 2005) and even to experienced lawyers who do not
specialize in legal ethics as a substantive field (Chambliss 2006). Large law
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firms increasingly employ full-time general counsel and other ethics and risk
management specialists to answer lawyers’ day-to-day questions and keep
abreast of changes in professional regulation (Chambliss and Wilkins 2002a;
Chambliss 2006; Davis 2008). Midsized law firms, too, are increasingly investing in specialized ethics and risk management personnel (Chambliss 2009).
Likewise, many public practice organizations, such as prosecutors’ offices and
legal services organizations, have created specialized ethics resources and
compliance infrastructure to address the various complex and recurring issues that they confront.
Thus, within many practice contexts, nonspecialists—such as junior lawyers
and even law-trained researchers—will have less doctrinal and/or experiential
expertise than the lawyers they observe. Arguably, therefore, these nonspecialists are not fully equipped to judge the technical—or normative—quality
of the work.
Large firm partners, for instance, tend to view new associates as unreliable
informants about most professional matters (Chambliss 2006). According to
partners, many so-called ethical issues raised by associates are actually the result of misunderstandings or lack of expertise. In the words of one law firm
general counsel:
Associates can be naïve. You get a breathless phone call, “The partner is asking me to back date documents!” And it turns out this is a closed corporation, five guys who have been working together for months, it’s a start up,
and now they need a current board ratification of prior decisions, perfectly
legal. No one is defrauding anyone. (1546)

Large firm partners also tend to be skeptical of legal academics, whom they
view as overly critical of the ethics of large firm practice. As one in-house ethics specialist remarked:
People in firms are reluctant to talk to academics because they tend to view
academics as ideological. There is this idea that lawyers are always trying to
cut corners. But lawyers call me all the time with questions. Once the firm
began providing this service, and lawyers knew there was someone there who
had an answer—lawyers are big rules followers. (Chambliss 2006, 1565)

Such skepticism about the judgment of junior lawyers and other nonspecialists is not limited to large firm partners, but rather is characteristic of experienced lawyers in many practice specialties. Divorce lawyers, legal services
lawyers, prosecutors, patent lawyers: As this volume illustrates, different types
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of lawyers face very different practice environments and tend to operate within
distinct and sometimes insular communities of practice. Each of these groups
has its own set of professional values and concerns, and develops specialized
norms of practice that go beyond—and, in some cases, depart from—the formal
rules. Thus, not only do lawyers, as a group, have a specialized ethical code, but
experienced lawyers tend to have their own specialized views on the code, backed
up by claims of even-more-specialized technical and normative expertise.
Nonspecialists, naturally, may be skeptical of specialists’ normative claims.
Indeed, the central theoretical debate within the sociology of professions is
the extent to which professional claims to authority are justified by specialized expertise. Functional theory holds that professional authority—including ethical self-regulation—is justified by the asymmetry of expertise between
professionals and nonprofessionals (Parsons 1994). “Professional” ethics, in
other words, both presumes and requires specialized expertise. As Talcott
Parsons (1994) has written:
Among the . . . basic characteristics [of the professions] is a level of special
technical competence that must be acquired through formal training and
that necessitates special mechanisms of social control in relation to the recipients of services because of the “competence gap” which makes it unlikely
that the “layman” can properly evaluate the quality of such services or the
credentials of those who offer them. (679)

Critics of functionalism question the scope and validity of professional
expertise (Collins 1979), including claims about the public purpose and effectiveness of professional ethics codes. Critics view professional ethics codes
primarily as a means of legitimating professional monopoly and staving off external regulation (Abel 1989; Caplow 1954). According to Richard Abel (1989),
for instance:
The suspicion that professional associations promulgate ethical rules more
to legitimate themselves in the eyes of the public than to engage in effective regulation is strengthened by the inadequacy of enforcement mecha
nisms. . . . Surveys repeatedly show that lawyers are ignorant of many rules
and fail to internalize those that they do know. . . . More disturbing, most
lawyers never even perceive moral dilemmas in their practice. (143)

These competing narratives provide a rich framework for empirical ethics research, including research about the sources and mechanisms of ethical
fading and other undesirable outcomes of lawyer socialization. The increasing
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specialization of lawyers and legal ethics as a substantive field does not mean
that “nonspecialists”—such as students, junior lawyers, and academic researchers—must abandon critical analysis of legal ethics doctrine or lawyers’ ethics
in practice. Grounding such critiques, however, requires a rigorous separation
between empirical and normative claims. This separation, in turn, requires the
systematic specification of normative benchmarks in research.

Implications for Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics in Practice
One implication of this analysis for students and legal ethics scholars is the
need to pay close attention to the ways researchers define “ethics.” Some research focuses on the development of ethics policies, committees, and other
“ethical infrastructure” (Chambliss and Wilkins 2002b; Schneyer 1998) and
lawyers’ use of such infrastructure (Chambliss and Wilkins 2002a; Davis 2008),
whereas other research focuses on lawyers’ ethical values and consciousness
(Alfieri 2006; Kirkland 2005; Suchman 1998). These two sets of variables,
though related in potentially significant ways, nevertheless may operate according to very different dynamics and have different implications for theoretical and normative analysis.
For instance, this chapter opened with two examples of differences between
junior and senior lawyers’ perceptions of “ethics,” as if the two examples suggested a single, normative theme. Yet the first example focused primarily on
junior lawyers’ access to structural (ethical and supervisory) supports within
firms, rather than their ethical values. As Christine Parker and Lyn Aitken
(2011, 430) explain, such findings are open to competing interpretations and
may primarily reflect junior lawyers’ place within the organizational hierarchy.
Research on business organizations has found that lower-level employees generally have more negative perceptions of organizational ethical culture than
senior employees and managers (Treviño 2005; Treviño, Weaver, and Brown
2008)—particularly lower-level employees who are dissatisfied with their jobs
(Key 1999, 222). Junior lawyers also may be unaware of the existence or operation of ethical infrastructure due to their short tenure in the firm (Parker and
Aitken 2011, 426–427). Parker and Aitken defined junior lawyers as lawyers
with one to three years of experience (417). Thus, differences between junior
and senior lawyers’ perceptions of and access to ethical supports within firms
do not necessarily suggest differences in their underlying values or changes in
lawyers’ values over time. Instead, such differences may stem primarily from
their structural positions in the firm.
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The second example, likewise, did not focus directly on lawyers’ values,
but rather on lawyers’ perceptions of other lawyers’ ethicality. The Michigan
data were drawn from a question about whether “the lawyers with whom I
deal (other than those in my own office) are highly ethical in their conduct,” in
which the term “ethical” was left undefined. Here, too, the differences between
junior and senior lawyers are open to competing interpretations. One interpretation, as implied by the initial pairing of the two examples, is that lawyer
socialization involves a shift from one set of ethical values and commitments
(for instance, those most consistent with universal or ordinary morality) to
another set of (arguably narrower and distorted or corrupted) commitments.
Another interpretation, however, consistent with the structural explanation
offered above for the Australian results, is that junior lawyers are more likely
to have negative perceptions of senior lawyers’ ethics—or of senior lawyers,
generally—than senior lawyers themselves. Such perceptions are typical not
only of junior employees but of people in general. One of the most consistent
findings in the business ethics literature is that most people view themselves as
more ethical than other people (Ford and Richardson 1994, 219). This tendency
may be most pronounced when evaluating people outside one’s own group
(such as people outside one’s own office or hierarchical status) (Regan 2007).
Thus, while the two opening examples may be theoretically related, in
suggesting an undesirable shift in lawyers’ ethical values over time, neither
is based on the direct measurement of lawyers’ values (or changes over time).
Moreover, both sets of findings may be explained by variables that are unrelated to lawyers’ ethical values but rather stem from more general organizational or psychological factors, such as respondents’ hierarchical positions or
the dynamics of group identification. This is not to say that such findings are
unimportant for lawyers and law practice organizations, but rather that closer
analysis is required to ground theoretical and normative claims.
A second implication of the benchmark problem and foregoing analysis is
that researchers must pay closer attention to what lawyers mean when they
talk about “ethics.” As a threshold matter, this means distinguishing between
lawyers’ references to legal ethics—in particular, the formal rules of legal ethics—and lawyers’ references to broader, universal ethics and values.
Lawyers in practice tend to use the term “ethics” to refer to the formal rules
of legal ethics (Chambliss 2010; Suchman 1998) or a specific regulated issue
that is particularly salient in their practice. For instance, large firm partners
tend to use the term “ethics” to refer to conflicts of interest, which in large firm
practice is a central and highly technical issue (Chambliss and Wilkins 2002a,
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567). Corporate litigators may use the term “ethics” to refer to the acceptable
level of aggressiveness in discovery (Suchman 1998, 854). Divorce lawyers may
use the term “ethics” to refer to their obligation to protect children’s interests
in accord with the guidelines for matrimonial lawyers (Mather and McEwen,
chapter 4).
Moreover, lawyers themselves tend to distinguish between these regulated
or doctrinal issues and broader, universal questions of ethics and values. For instance, Michael Kelly (1994, 2007) began his ethnographic research on lawyers
by looking for ethical issues and problems that he could use to enrich classroom
teaching in the required law school course on legal ethics. He found, however,
that he quickly “had to abandon this approach” (1994, 229) because “the lawyers I interviewed were largely disinterested in the kinds of ethical issues I was
addressing with my students” (2007, 9). Instead, the lawyers he interviewed
were concerned with “their lives in practice” (9) or what Kelly called “meaningof-life ethics” (13). He noted, “Lawyers worry about their group practice, its
direction, its future, and its quality. . . . There is a lot of talk about friendship,
about the value of a working life spent with (at least some) colleagues whom
one admires, respects, and enjoys. . . . Talk about values is common” (9–10).
Likewise, Mark Suchman (1998, 843) found that the litigators he interviewed “repeatedly distinguished between ethics (meaning the letter and,
to a limited extent, the spirit of the professional rules) and morals (meaning
substantive issues of right and wrong).” He reported: “A large-firm associate
captured this sense of the distance between ‘ethics’ and ‘right and wrong’ by
noting that ‘most of the issues that we’re talking about here aren’t issues of ultimate justice or even specific justice. They are questions of following the rules
so that the cases will come out, and the right information will be presented,
and ultimately, justice will be served.’ ”
Lawyers also may distinguish between regulated issues with broad normative implications, such as billing fraud, and those with primarily tactical and/
or risk management implications, such as the rules of discovery and large law
firm conflicts of interest (Chambliss 2005, 2006). In the words of one law firm
general counsel:
We take risks all the time and we know what they are. God knows the courts
get them confused. Able lawyers come in and say, “There’s a conflict of interest, what could be worse?” Thirty to forty percent of malpractice claims
have in them a conflict of interest, although it is often hard to connect the
conflict with any actual harm. But the jury goes to town. What you and I
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would consider a risk issue, not a moral issue, gets treated by the courts and
juries as indistinct from the drug addict lawyer who stole money from his
client trust accounts. It is something that really frosts me. . . . There are lots
of foaming-at-the-mouth moralists in the field. (Chambliss 2006, 1566)

Of course, the way lawyers talk about ethics and the distinctions they draw
between doctrinal, tactical, and normative issues may be highly theoretically
significant. The theory of ethical fading is precisely about the ways in which ethical issues become drained of normative content over time, for instance, through
cognitive narrowing, repetition, and self-deception (Tenbrunsel and Messick
2004). This theory suggests that the specialization of lawyers—and legal ethics
as a substantive field—may tend to crowd out or inhibit more universal moral
awareness and engagement among lawyers (Alfieri 2006; Raymond 2005).
For instance, Alfieri (2006) has argued that the increased focus on “risk management” in large law firms has diminished lawyers’ appreciation of the moral
choices they face and undermined “classical norms of . . . fraternity and community” (1926). Raymond (2005), too, has argued that the “professionalization
of ethics” in large law firms has led lawyers to view ethics as “just another area
of specialization” (159) and “runs the risk of . . . taking ethical issues out mainstream discourse” (160). Richard Moorhead (2010, 227) has referred to this as the
“paradox of specialization.” As he notes, “Specialization is capable of giving rise
to benefits (in terms of improved quality) and detriments (reduced access, increased cost, and an inability to see problems beyond one’s own specialty . . . ).”
But while lawyer specialization may encourage ethical fading, not every example of specialized ethics necessarily represents ethical fading. Grounding
the theory of ethical fading—and, by implication, ethical learning—requires
attention to different sources of “ethics,” as well as to lawyers in different settings and stages of their careers. Only through systematic descriptions of lawyers’ ethics in practice can empirical ethics research provide the foundation for
theoretical and normative critique.
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